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Traditionally, resource limitation in evolutionary game theory (EGT) is assumed just to impose
a constant population size. Here we show that resource limitations may generate dynamical payoffs
able to alter an original prisoner’s dilemma (PD), and to allow for stable coexistence between
unconditional cooperators and defectors in well-mixed populations. This is a consequence of a self-
organizing process that turns the interaction payoff matrix into evolutionary neutral, and represents
a resource-based control mechanism preventing the spread of defectors. To our knowledge, this is
the first example of coexistence in well-mixed populations with a game structure different from a
snowdrift game.
PACS numbers: 02.50.Le,87.10.-e,87.18.-h,87.23.-n
Cooperative behaviors are common in nature, and nec-
essary for the evolutionary appearance of higher selec-
tive units –such as eukaryotic cells or multicellular life–
from simpler components [1]. However, the survival of
the fittest under the action of natural selection seems to
foster selfish behaviors taking advantage of other indi-
viduals [2, 3]. It is therefore intriguing how cooperative
behaviors can emerge and survive in a world ruled by
natural selection. This issue is frequently addressed in
the context of evolutionary game theory (EGT), where
the prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game [4] has been used as a
paradigm for understanding the evolution of cooperation,
as its simplified non-iterated version is the worst scenario
for the survival of cooperation [5]; if interactions between
individuals follow a PD and reproductive success grows
with payoffs, cooperative behavior is led to extinction in
large well-mixed populations [5, 6]. In the last decades
some mechanisms have been found allowing cooperative
behaviors to survive in the absence of genetic related-
ness, but none of them works for the simplified PD in
the absence of features such as memory [7, 8], reputa-
tion gain [9], network structure [10–12] or other sensory
inputs [13, 14].
Here we study the influence of resource limitation on
the emergence of cooperation. We find that in addition
to imposing a finite population size, as usually assumed
in EGT [4, 5, 7–15], it may generate dynamic payoffs [16–
18]. In the absence of resource limitation the interactions
between cooperators and defectors fulfil a simplified PD,
as determined by the selfish strategy, and thus coopera-
tors extinguish, as expected in evolving well-mixed pop-
ulations. Surprisingly, resource limitation may drive a
self-organizing process that allows for stable coexistence
between cooperators and defectors. In contrast to previ-
ous studies including ecological features, in which coexis-
tence happens only in public goods games with variable
interaction group sizes [19], it is transient [20] or requires
spatial structure [21, 22], here we find stable coexistence
for pairwise interactions without population structure.
This stable coexistence resembles the homeostatic equi-
librium in the daisy world [23, 24], as both are mediated
by environmental factors driving the system out from
equilibrium.
In order to study this, we develop a model consisting
of an evolving well-mixed population of self-replicating
individuals that receive resources from the environment
and exchange resources during interactions. No popu-
lation structure, memory, learning abilities or any other
sensory inputs are assumed. Each individual i is rep-
resented by its internal amount of resources Ei and its
strategy, namely cooperate (C) or defect (D). The in-
ternal amount of resources may be interpreted as the
amount that belongs to it, independently of why or how.
The environment provides resources in portions Ei
0
per
unit time to randomly chosen individuals independently
of their strategy, thus not modifying the structure of the
payoffs. For simplicity, we impose a constant total re-
source influx ET , though results also apply for non con-
stant fluxes (see [25]). If the amount of resources of an
individual exceeds a value Es, it splits into two identical
copies with half its internal amount of resources.
Defectors are characterized by the maximum amount
of resources associated to an interaction: the cost spent
(Ec) for stealing a reward (Er) from the co-player. If
the internal resources of a defector are smaller than the
cost Ec, it does not pay the cost nor receives the re-
ward. If the interaction partner has resources below the
reward, the entire amount of resources is sequestered.
We assume that these quantities are inherited without
mutation; they represent physiologic, morphologic or ge-
netic characteristics intrinsic to individuals and cannot
be modified by choice.
We consider large populations, simultaneous interac-
tions and Er > Ec > 0, although the same results are
obtained if one assumes that every interaction is carried
out by a donor and received by the co-player [18]. The
2interaction matrix determined by the strategies is thus
( C D
C 0 −Er
D ∆E −Ec
)
(1)
and equals a simplified PD, with defectors paying a cost
Ec and obtaining a net reward∆E = Er−Ec > 0 (payoffs
for the row player, we will omit C and D in the following
matrixes).
Finally, we assume that the limiting resource necessary
for reproduction provides no advantage for keeping alive;
therefore deaths occur at random with a frequency (rate)
f relative to receiving resources and interacting, which
happen equally frequently.
According to the PD structure of resource exchanges
among cooperators and defectors in the absence of re-
sources limitation, defectors should have a larger resource
intake, reaching faster the splitting bound Es and thus
reproducing quicker (i.e. fitness is proportional to re-
source exchanges). Therefore one would expect homoge-
neous populations of defectors as the outcome of the evo-
lutionary process. However, the limitation of resources
generates a distribution of resources among individuals
in the population. As a consequence, the average reward
stolen from cooperators E′r may decrease below Er, since
the internal resources of some cooperators may fall below
this quantity, thus modifying the payoffs. If the net aver-
age benefit of defectors ∆E′ = E′r −Ec remains negative
all over the time, the payoff matrix does not correspond
to a PD anymore; it is turned into a harmony game and
cooperation becomes the dominant strategy. Simulations
show that the model yields the later behavior and also,
more interestingly, stable coexistence of cooperation and
defection (Fig. 1); see [25] for details on the simulations.
Dominance of cooperation was already found in a pre-
vious model assuming that resources are necessary for
keeping alive [18] which, however, did not provide coex-
istence.
Coexistence in this scenario requires a complex feed-
back process whose exact analysis is quite difficult be-
cause of the complex nonlinearities involved in the dy-
namics. However, a simple quantitative reasoning ex-
hibits the logic of this feedback and allows for an ana-
lytic estimation of the final stable state of the system.
Let us note that an increase in the number of defectors
over the equilibrium value would cause an overexploita-
tion of cooperators, thus reducing their resource content.
This would have two effects: (i) it would reduce coop-
erators’ reproduction rate (fitness) because they become
farther from the splitting bound Es, and (ii) it would
also decrease the average reward obtained by defectors,
which thereby reduces their fitness. If the second effect
dominates over the first one, then stable coexistence be-
comes possible, as the feedback pushes the system back
to equilibrium. A similar argument applies for a decrease
in the number of defectors.
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FIG. 1: Simulation results for the evolution of the fraction of
cooperators ρ for two different values of the reward Er and
cost Ec associated to the selfish strategy (averaged over 10
runs). In some cases the simplified PD payoff structure is
modified by the limitation of resources, which allows for co-
existence of cooperation and defection (solid line) and dom-
inance of cooperation (dashed line). The final stable states
are independent of the initial ρ and N . Parameters: f = 1,
Es = 1000, ET = 8200000, Ec = 660; solid line, ∆E = 310;
dashed line, ∆E = 10.
The entire system is in equilibrium when the resource
influxes and out fluxes in the populations of both cooper-
ators and defectors cancel out. The balance of resources
in these subpopulations contains three contributions: en-
vironmental supply, deaths, and interactions. They are
expressed in the following equations
dEC
dt
= NC [E0 − fE
C
− pE′r(1 − ρ)] (2)
dED
dt
= ND[E0 − fE
D
− pEc + pE
′
rρ] (3)
Ej , E
j
and Nj denote, respectively the total resource
content, average resources per individual and number of
individuals of the subpopulations j = C,D ; E0 = ET /N
is the mean amount of resources received by an individual
per unit time, with N = NC + ND the instantaneous
population size; ρ = NC/N is the fraction of cooperators;
f is the death probability per individual and interaction,
and p the fraction of the population of defectors able to
pay the cost (i.e. with Ei > Ec).
In equilibrium, the populations of cooperators and de-
fectors become constant in time so that the resource pools
ED and EC reach a constant value. One thus finds the
equilibrium condition
p(E′r − Ec) = f [E
D
− E
C
] (4)
This shows that the coexistence depends on the death
frequency f . For simplicity we will assume in this ana-
lytic derivation that deaths happen much less frequently
than interactions, i.e. the limit f → 0; this corresponds
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FIG. 2: Final fraction of cooperators ρ represented in terms of resources cost (Ec) and net benefit (∆E = Er−Ec) of the selfish
strategy. In black ρ = 1, in white ρ = 0. One observes well defined regions of coexistence of cooperation and defection, as well
as regions where cooperation is the dominant strategy. In (a) prediction according to Eq. (7) (see [25] for a highly improved
analytical prediction); in (b) results of agent-based simulations averaged over 50 runs (f = 0.01,Es = 1000, ET = 420000). In
(c) we show the different games corresponding to a 2x2 matrix; the dashed line shows the places where the payoffs in the model
lay (see Eq. (10)). Point A denotes the final payoffs for coexistence states, where the payoff matrix is evolutionary neutral;
points B and C are examples of final payoffs for situations where cooperation and defection are dominant, respectively.
to many interactions in a lifetime, when the effects of
interactions become more relevant. Other f values are
studied through simulations [25]. Since p never equals
zero due to the constant resource influx, Eq. (4) reduces
in this limit to
Ec = E
′
r (5)
which states that, in equilibrium, the cost paid by de-
fectors equals the reward stolen from cooperators. In
order to analytically predict the region of coexistence in
the parameters space and the corresponding population
composition, we need to know the average reward E′r in
terms of the parameters Er and Ec. This implies the cal-
culation of the equilibrium distribution of resources for
cooperators, which is a difficult task due to the nonlin-
earities involved in the dynamics. Instead, we can give a
rough heuristic estimate as follows. The lower the frac-
tion of cooperators in the population, the more frequent
any cooperator meets a defector, thereby cooperators be-
come overexploited and their average internal resources
decrease. Thus the average reward E′r is expected to de-
crease as ρ decreases. We assume a linear relationship
between both quantities, E′r = αρ, with α a positive con-
stant. By the moment we consider that when ρ is close to
1, the effect of defectors is expected to be small, so that
at first order we approximate the resource distribution
of cooperators as uniform. For uniform distributions [25]
one finds E′r = Er − E
2
r/(2Es). We thus propose
E′r = ρ(Er −
E2r
2Es
) (6)
By combining Eq. (6) with Eq. (5) one obtains an ex-
pression for the equilibrium fraction of cooperators
ρ =
Ec
Er − E2r/2Es
. (7)
In order to analyze in detail the behavior of the model,
we have performed extensive numerical simulations cov-
ering the whole parameters space. They confirm the sta-
bility of the coexistence for all death frequencies, and
show that the final stable state is independent of the ini-
tial conditions and resource influx (and thus, final pop-
ulation size) [25]. Figs. 2a,b show a good qualitative
agreement between the predicted ρ and the outcome of
the simulations. Deviations root in the linear approxi-
mation assumed in Eq. (6) (see [25]).
Let us notice that the obtained stable coexistence be-
tween cooperators and defectors presents a new out-
come in the context of two-player games, where a sta-
ble mixed state is only expected in Snowdrift (or Hawk-
Dove) games, which have a payoff structure different from
ours. In general, symmetric two-player games can be de-
scribed through the interaction matrix [26]

0 a
b 0

 (8)
where coefficients a and b are assumed to be constant.
Applying the replicator equation [6, 15, 26] to analyze
the evolution of the population, three cases are possible
(see Fig. 2c): (i) dominance of one strategy (when a and
b differ in sign); this is the case of the non-iterated PD,
where defection always wins; (ii) bistability (if both a and
b are negative), in this case the final state is homogeneous
and depends on initial conditions; this is what happens
4in stag hunt games, where coordinating with the partner
pays; and (iii) coexistence (if both a and b are positive);
this is what occurs in Snowdrift games, when it always
pays to play the opposite of the co-player.
In our model, fitness is directly proportional to re-
source exchanges, because individuals reproduce when
their resources overcome an upper bound that is the same
for cooperators and defectors. Resource exchanges come
from the environment and from interactions. The re-
source supply from the environment is the same for de-
fectors and cooperators; it just provides a constant to
all fitness values and can be omitted in the fitness ma-
trix. The latter is thus ruled by the average resources
exchanged through interactions, which aside from a scale
factor translating resource exchanges to fitness, is [18]

 0 −pE
′
r
p∆E′ −pEc

 . (9)
As stated above, p stands for the fraction of defectors
whose resources exceed the cost Ec. Let us note that
this factor does not change the payoff structure in any
case, as it multiplies all payoffs, and it only modifies the
time scale of the dynamics. The interaction matrix can
be rewritten in the form of matrix (8) by adding pEc to
the second column (as adding a constant to a column
does not affect the replicator dynamics [6, 26]):

 0 −p∆E
′
p∆E′ 0

 (10)
i.e. a = −b = −p∆E′. According to the classification
given above, this payoff matrix leads to dominance of one
strategy whenever p∆E′ 6= 0. In the absence of resource
limitation ∆E′ = ∆E > 0 and we have a PD. If resources
are limited, there exists a wide range of parameters for
which the ∆E′ is tuned to zero for a specific mixture of
cooperators and defectors (see Figs. 2a,b); thus, the sta-
ble equilibrium is the result of a dynamical self-organizing
process and not of the game structure itself (see Fig. 2c).
We can use the payoff matrix (10) to gain further in-
sight into the stability of the coexistence state found in
our model. In Eq. (6) we proposed the rough estimate
E′r = αρ for the net benefit of defectors, with α > 0.
Thus, we have ∆E′ = αρ − Ec. Aside from a positive
factor relating fitness and payoffs in Eq. (10), the repli-
cator equation yields
dρ
dt
= −ρ(1− ρ)p∆E = pρ(1− ρ)(Ec − αρ) (11)
which supplies three equilibria, ρ = 0, 1 and Ec/α. Since
p > 0, the mixed state is the stable one for 0 < Ec/α < 1,
in agreement with the stability of the coexistence states
observed in the simulations.
We have presented a scenario which allows for stable
coexistence of unconditional cooperators and defectors in
well-mixed populations under pairwise interactions. This
result is quite robust, since it does not depend on initial
conditions, and it is also observed in small populations
– though in this case fluctuations may lead to the ex-
tinction of one strategy – and under nonconstant influx
of resources ([25]). This stable coexistence roots on a
selforganizing process which implicitly includes the envi-
ronment, and it is the feedback induced by environmental
constraints and defectors’ behavior which turns the pay-
off matrix into evolutionary neutral and allows for the
stability of the system. The evolutionary neutrality of
the system (environment + individuals) and its stability
as a whole, might be a first step towards the emergence
of new units of selection by providing a selforganizing
mechanism preventing the spread of selfish mutants al-
ternative to central control (see [1]).
Let us also remark that, in contrast to previous models
in evolutionary dynamics, the model presented here ex-
plicitly sets the issue in a nonequilibrium context, where
a (resource) flux drives the system out from equilibrium.
The observed selforganized coexistence state may be seen
as another example of selforganizing process found in
nonequilibrium systems such as, for instance, the un-
expected oscillations in Belusov- Zabhotinsky reactions.
This perspective may bear interest in economic contexts,
another classical field of evolutionary game theory, where
some authors claim that economic systems should be
modeled as open, nonlinear nonequilibrium systems in-
stead of the closed, equilibrium view dominant in tradi-
tional economics [27, 28].
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In this supplementary material we provide details of the analytical derivations carried out in the
main text and of the agent based simulations.
PACS numbers:
I. SIMPLIFIED PRISONER’S DILEMMA (PD)
GAME.
The rank of the payoffs in the PD is
T > R > P > S. (1)
If the game is played repeatedly by the same two indi-
viduals (iterated PD), which happens with a very low
probability as we assumed big population sizes (in or-
der to make mean field approximation), the condition
2R > T + S is also required. For a simplified PD, the
condition T −R = P −S, also known as equal gains from
switching, must be fulfilled. In our study, the payoffs
take values T = Er − Ec, R = 0, P = −Ec, S = −Er
and the three conditions are fulfilled by imposing
Er > Ec > 0. (2)
II. RESOURCE DISTRIBUTION OF
COOPERATORS: ESTIMATION OF E′r.
A. Uniform distribution of resources
Let us call P (E < Er) the probability that a cooper-
ator has an internal amount of resources lower than Er.
The mean payoff for a defector playing against a cooper-
ator can be written as E′r = P (E > Er)Er + P (E <
Er)Er, where Er is the mean internal amount of re-
sources of cooperators in the region E < Er. This may
be rewritten as E′r = Er − P (E < Er)(Er − Er). For
uniform distributions of resources this equation yields
E′r = Er −
E2r
2Es
. (3)
B. Linear approximation for E′r
To derive Eq.(7) in the main text we assumed the lin-
ear dependence E′r = αρ, where α is chosen to attain
expression (3) when ρ = 1. Fig. 1 shows a reasonable
agreement between this simple expression and the sim-
ulation results. As assumed, the average reward E′r is
found to grow with the fraction of cooperators, although
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FIG. 1: Normalized average reward of defectors E′r/(Er −
E2r/(2Es) versus fraction of cooperators in equilibrium ρ.
Symbols denote simulation results expanding over the whole
parameter space for f = 0.01. The straight line corresponds
to the assumption of a linear relationship between E′r and ρ.
One finds a reasonable agreement between both results with
some deviations at low and high ρ.
a quadratic dependence is more adequate than just a lin-
ear one. If one assumes such a quadratic dependence the
agreement between predictions and simulations greatly
improves (see Figs. 2b,d).
III. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS.
The final state of the system was found to be indepen-
dent of the initial conditions, i.e. initial population size
N0, fraction of cooperators ρ and initial distritution of
resources, provided that the initial population size is big
enough (see section IIID below). In Figs. 2 both in the
paper and the SM, we started all simulations with a pop-
ulation size N0 = 10000, a uniform random distribution
of internal resources and an initial fraction of coopera-
tors of ρ = 0.5. The amount of resources for splitting
was taken Es = 1000, which sets the scale of resources in
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FIG. 2: Simulation results for (a) f = 1, i.e. interactions
and deaths equally frequent, and (b) f = 0.01, i.e. a hun-
dred interactions per death. The regions of coexistence and
dominance of cooperation grow with decreasing f . Analytic
results for f = 0.01 assuming (c) a linear dependence, and
(d) a quadratic fit between E′r and ρ as obtained from fig-
ure 1 above. The analytic predictions improve by using the
quadratic fit, as it can be observed comparing figures (b) and
(d), but the simple linear relationship already gathers the
main features.
the simulations. For ET we used 420000, so that the total
population N attained values of several thousands, large
enough to minimize finite size effects; however, the mech-
anism works for much smaller population sizes (smaller
than 100 individuals, see fig. 5), provided that random
fluctuations on the number of individuals do not allow
the system to reach fixation. Simulations run over around
1000 time steps, where a time step is defined as a number
of interactions equal to the population size, and stopped
if a homogeneous population was reached before.
A. Resource allocation
We tested two resource allocation methods: supply-
ing portions uniformly distributed on the interval Ei
0
∈
(0, 2ET /N) and of fixed size E
i
0 = ET /N , where N de-
notes the number of individuals in the population; both
provided the same results, but the first one (which is the
one used in the figures) introduces some extra stochas-
ticity in the model. As said above, ET was chosen big
enough as to avoid effects due to finite population sizes,
while keeping feasible simulation times (mean population
sizes around 104 individuals).
B. Updating
The updating is completely asynchronous [1] and with
overlapping generations, which avoids the appearance of
synchronization effects and mimics reproductive dynam-
ics observed in nature. The implementation used is as
follows: Every interaction time step six individuals are
chosen at random; of them (a) two receive an amount
of resources Ei
0
from the environment, (b) two interact,
and (c) two die with a probability f . Other asynchronous
implementations where tested, as choosing just four in-
dividuals per interaction step, one to act as donor, one
as recipient of the act, one to receive resources and one
to die with probability f . Results using this updating
were identical, but simulation times were much longer,
for which reason we choose the first method to carry out
the computer simulations.
C. Remarks on the parameter space.
Our model contains 5 parameters: ET , Es, Ec, Er
and f . If one doubles all the parameters related to the
resources, i.e. all of them except f , the dynamics does
not change, provided there are no finite population size
effects. Then, one of the parameters in the model just
defines the scale with respect to the others. We thus set
Es = 1000 without loss of generality. Furthermore, as
long as ET takes a large value (ET ≫ Es), it only affects
the final number of individuals, but not the strategy of
the final state (this is confirmed by simulations). This
leaves us with the free parameters, Ec, Er (both smaller
than Es) and f . We have explored the dynamics for all
values of Ec and Er in the region Es > Er > Ec, and for
several values of f (see Fig. 2). In this way, our analysis
covers the whole parameter space.
D. Independence of results on initial conditions
and on resource influx
As mentioned above, the simulation results are very
robust. In particular, they are independent on initial
conditions aside from finite size effects when either N or
ρ are too small. For instance, in figure 3 we show simula-
tions results starting from four different initial amounts
of cooperators and defectors (NC , ND), all leading to the
same final steady state.
In addition, our results are robust with respect to
changes in the resource influx and, in particular, the lat-
ter is not required to be constant. Figure 4 shows simu-
lation results for a sudden reduction of ET to its fifth. As
expected, the population size N also reduces to its fifth,
but the fraction of cooperators hardly changes. Indeed,
it is observed a slight transient advantage for cooperators
when resources are reduced, and a transient advantage of
defectors when resources are increased.
3Finally, Figure 5a analizes the limit of small population
sizes. One observes that both the number of individuals
in the population and the fraction of cooperators reach
steady states with larger random flutuations. The other
panels of Figure 5 study the effect of oscillatory changes
of the total resource influx ET in these small populations.
The population numbers are found to follow the resource
influx ET (except at fast oscillations of period w = 10,
shorter than the time scale of the population dynamics).
Remarkably, the fraction of cooperators remains essen-
tially constant, though fluctuations may drive the system
to the extinction of one strategy (Fig. 5f).
[1] G. Szabo and G. Fath, Phys. Rep. 446, 97 (2007).
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FIG. 3: Evolution of (a) ρ, (b) NC , (c) ND and (d) N , for four different initial numbers of cooperators and defectors. It can
be observed that in all cases, even when the initial values are far away from the final state, the system recovers its equilibrium
values given there is enough time. In the case in which the initial number of defectors is much bigger than its final stable
value (five times bigger, green lines), or that of cooperators is very small (13 times smaller, black lines), the population of
cooperators/defectors (respectively) decreases initially, and thus this situation could drive one of the populations to extinction
if its initial number was small enough (see Fig. 5). Parameters: ET = 420000, Ec = 300,∆E = 400, f = 0.01. Final values:
ρ = 0.54, NC = 5380, ND = 4580, N = 9960
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FIG. 4: Simulation results dividing by five the total amount of resources ET introduced into the system at t = 1000, and
recovering the initial value at t = 3000. It can be observed that the population size behaves as ET , decreasing in a factor 5
during the intermediate period, while the fraction of cooperators is only slightly affected during the short time spans in which
the population increases or decreases. Parameters: ET,inic = 420000, Ec = 300,∆E = 400, f = 0.01; values in equilibrium:
ρ = 0.54, N = 9960
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FIG. 5: Dynamics of small populations. Simulation results for (a) a constant ET = 4000, and a variable ET = 4000 +
3500sin(2pit/w) in between t = 5000 and t = 15000 with periods (b) w = 100, (c) w = 1000, (d) w = 5000, (e),(f) w = 10000.
It can be observed in figures (b)-(e) that the inclusion of a variable resource influx only introduces noise in the value of ρ,
while N follows the behaviour of ET . For values of w lower than 100 (the one in fig. (b)), N does not follow ET and only
some noise is introduced into the sytem. In (f) we show an example of fixation of one strategy: a random fluctuation makes
the system remain in a state with 15 individuals during enough time as to allow for fixation of defectors. Note that typical
fluctuations in the equilibrium (fig.(a)) have a standard deviation on NC of 8 individuals, while it is of 4 individuals for ND;
thus, any state in which the number of individuals is maintaind in very low values during time enough will reach fixation, being
fixation of defectors favoured over coopeartors in this case. Mean values in equilibrium (fig.(a)): ρ = 0.53, N = 93. Parameters:
Ec = 300,∆E = 400, f = 0.01.
